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Procedural Uncertainty Attending the
Assertion of the Political Offense
Exception in Extradition Hearings
Charles R. Meyer, 1H*
INTRODUCTION
The American approach to the political offense exception to extradition is
under increasing attack. Unfavorable commentary, 1 sparked in part by the
recent decision In re McMullen, 2 has noted the confusion present in the
operation of the exception. This article will trace some of the difficulties
to the uncertain procedural burdens of raising and proving the exception
in the judicial hearing. The current practice should be reformed to amelio-
rate the confusion. To this end, the United States Congress or Supreme
Court must intervene to unify the procedural approaches taken by U.S.
magistrates with respect to raising and proving the political offense excep-
tion.
DEFINITION AND OPERATION OF THE EXCEPTION
A foreign government will request the extradition of an individual it seeks
for a violation of its criminal law through diplomatic channels. The U.S.
State Department has the discretion to deny such a request. 3 However,
before the State Department can grant a request for extradition, federal law
requires a hearing before a federal magistrate. 4
This section 3184 hearing is not a criminal proceeding, nor is it strictly
governed by American rules of criminal procedure. 5 Rather, it is a process
to ensure that there is sufficient evidence to support a request for extradi-
tion, and to exact compliance with the applicable extradition treaty. 6
Because the hearing is not designed to test guilt, the courts severely restrict
the alien fugitive's right to introduce evidence to defeat the request. 7 In
* Charles R. Meyer, III is a member of the class of 1983, University of Michigan Law
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general, the individual is permitted to introduce only evidence which tends
to show that he or she is not the person sought, 8 or that the offense is not
extraditable. For an offense to be extraditable, it must be contained in the
extradition treaty 9 and not subject to, inter alia, the political offense excep-
tion.
All American extradition treaties contain a political offense excep-
tion. 10 However, the treaty language is vague. For example, the treaty of
extradition between the United States and Thailand defines the exception
as follows: "The provisions of the present Treaty shall not import a claim
of extradition for any crime or offense of a political character, nor for acts
connected with such crimes or offenses; and no person surrendered...
shall be tried or punished for a political crime or offense." "
Because the treaties are silent on what constitutes a political offense, the
judiciary has adopted the British standard. 12 This test of whether an
offense is political has two components. First, the defendant must show a
violent political disturbance, civil war, or revolution in the requesting state
at the time of the alleged acts. Second, the acts charged against the alien
must be incidental to, or in furtherance of, the disturbance, civil war, or
revolution. 13 The U.S. Supreme Court, in its only detailed opinion in this
field, declared the issue of whether the offense is political or not to be one
"chiefly of fact." 14 This determination has had a significant impact on the
case law developing the exception since district and circuit courts have
subsequently given magistrates wide discretion owing to the factual nature
of the decision.
PROCEDURAL CONFUSION
Section 3184, which authorizes the extradition hearing, is silent as to the
procedural requirements for raising the political offense exception. The
provision merely states "[i]f, on such hearing, [the magistrate] deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper
treaty ... he shall certify ... that a warrant may issue ... according to
the stipulations of the treaty." 15 It directs the magistrate to the appropriate
extradition treaty. However, none of the ninety-seven treaties currently in
force contain any rules governing the procedure whereby the political
offense exception is raised or proven. 16 The treaty article containing the
exception typically does nothing more than refer the decision as to wheth-
er an offense is political to the requested state. The treaty does not define
how the requested state is to make that determination. 17
Unfortunately, the courts have been unable to clarify the treaties and
statutes. There is no direct judicial review once the magistrate makes his
findings on the fugitive's extradition. 18 A collateral attack is permitted
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through two devices-a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, 19 or an action
for a declaratory judgment-but it is limited. 20 Only the fugitive may
avail himself of these devices; no appeal by the requesting state, or the U.S.
Government on its behalf, is permitted to contest the denial of certifica-
tion. 21 Moreover, review of the extradition hearing cannot be used to
reopen the findings of the magistrate. The only permissible inquiries are:
whether the magistrate had jurisdiction; whether the offense was within
the treaty; and whether there was any evidence warranting the finding of
reasonable ground to believe the accused guilty. 22 The severe restrictions
placed on district and circuit court review of the Section 3184 hearing
explains the dearth of reported decisions in the extradition field. This
limited review and the concomitant lack of appellate guidance have con-
tributed directly to the procedural confusion with respect to the burden of
raising and proving the political offense exception. 23
The Supreme Court has intervened only twice in cases involving the
exception: in 1896 to limit sharply the scope of habeas corpus review of
the magistrate's hearing, 24 and indirectly in 1958 in a per curiam opinion
vacating a Ninth Circuit judgment and ordering a magistrate hearing prior
to habeas corpus review. 25 The survey below of the case law from the four
circuits which have dealt with the exception will suggest that the absence
of statutory, treaty, or Supreme Court direction has led to the present
procedural uncertainty. Each federal magistrate is free to decide on an ad
hoc basis who bears the burden of raising, presenting, and proving the
exception.
The two most recent decisions at the magistrate's level involving the
political offense exception are worth contrasting. They illustrate the sub-
stantial procedural confusion. In re Abu Eain 26 involved a request by Israel
for the extradition of a fugitive accused of murdering two civilians killed
by a bomb placed in an Israeli market. The magistrate labelled the excep-
tion a defense, and required the accused to assert it. 27 Eain introduced
evidence from expert witnesses bearing upon the interpretation of the
treaty exception, and added evidence tying his conduct to that interpreta-
tion. 28 Deemphasizing the relevance of this evidence the magistrate per-
mitted and relied heavily upon unsolicited evidence from the State
Department, which defined the American view of terrorism as being an
activity not protected by the political offense exception. 29 Based on this
record, the magistrate held that Eain's acts were common crimes, and
therefore not within the purview of the exception. The memorandum
opinion does not indicate which party bore the ultimate burden of persua-
sion. 30
In re McMullen 31 involved a request by the United Kingdom for the
extradition of a fugitive accused of murdering British soldiers killed by a
bomb placed near some barracks in England. The magistrate labelled the
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exception an "exclusion," which the accused must assert. 32 McMullen
introduced some evidence bearing on the situation in Northern Ireland,
and the magistrate took judicial notice of historical events dating back
sixty years. 33 In contrast to Fain, unsolicited State Department evidence
was excluded. 34 Based on this record, the magistrate determined that
McMullen had established a prima facie case that his offense was political.
The magistrate ruled that the burden of coming forward with evidence
shifted to the requesting state, which subsequently failed to meet this
burden. The Court noted that the accused bore the ultimate burden of
persuasion. 35
The magistrates in Eain and McMullen differed on the role of the ac-
cused's evidence, whether judicial notice by the magistrate was permissi-
ble, the use of State Department evidence, and the weight accorded to the
various evidentiary sources. These are but two cases. The use of the excep-
tion in extradition is bound to rise in the near future. 36 With 488 federal
magistrates, 37 the possibility for continued procedural confusion is clearly
present as the magistrates have wide discretion in all matters involving the
section 3184 extradition hearing. 38
The procedural confusion noted above is especially disturbing because
one of the primary purposes of the section 3184 hearing is to provide
procedural due process for the accused. 39 The fugitive is almost always a
stranger to the American legal process. While he may have legal counsel, 40
the absence of procedural uniformity in raising, presenting, and proving
the political offense exception detracts from the due process safeguards
which a judicial hearing is supposed to provide. If the procedural require-
ments are uncertain or unfair, the fugitive is less likely to be able to invoke
the protection afforded by the political offense exception. Procedural
disarray can cause apparent substantive inconsistency as in Fain and
McMullen. 41 By analyzing the various approaches which have been taken
with respect to raising, presenting, and proving the political offense excep-
tion in the magistrate's hearing, this article will derive proposals designed
to instill the desired uniformity.
RAISING THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
There are three possibilities in assigning the burden of raising the political
offense exception. The accused might raise the issue as an affirmative
defense to extradition. The requesting state might negate the existence of
the exception as an element of its request for extradition. Finally, the
magistrate could decide sua sponte whether the exception is an issue based
on the documents and evidence before him. There is no uniform approach
to be derived from the case law and the policy behind the exception.
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A review of the four circuits which have dealt with the issue reveals that
even within circuits different approaches have been taken. For example,
the early Ninth Circuit case of Karadzole v. Artukovic dealt with a request by
Yugoslavia for the extradition of a former wartime official accused of
ordering the murder of 200,000 concentration camp inmates. The court
held that the magistrate should decide whether to raise the political offense
exception based on the face of the requesting state's complaint or indict-
ment, or on facts of which the magistrate took notice. 42 By contrast, in
McMullen-a case also decided in the Ninth Circuit-the magistrate placed
the burden on the accused, much like an affirmative defense. 43
The Second Circuit also has a checkered history with respect to raising
the exception. In the early case of Gallina v. Fraser-involving a request by
Italy for the extradition of a fugitive accused of robbery-the burden was
placed on the accused. 44 Subsequently, the Southern District of New York
has alternated between requiring the magistrate to raise the issue sua sponte
during the hearing, 45 and leaving the issue to the magistrate's discre-
tion, 46 who presumably could take any of the three approaches outlined
above. Currently, the Fifth Circuit follows the rule that the issue is one
falling within the magistrate's discretion, 47 while the Seventh Circuit has
consistently characterized the exception a defense, placing the burden on
the accused. 48
This confusion may be traced in part to a terminological misunderstand-
ing. In Collins v. Loisel the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that "a person
arrested for extradition is entitled to introduce evidence rebutting probable
cause, but not evidence in defense." 49 This language has been picked up
by other courts, 50 and has raised uncertainty in labelling the political
offense exception. 51
A careful reading of the opinion in Collins yields the conclusion that the
language was intended only to cover evidence introduced as to ordinary
criminal defenses (insanity, duress and the like). Since the extradition
hearing is not a criminal proceeding, 52 criminal defenses should be reject-
ed. However, the political offense exception, as a bar to extradition derived
from treaty language, operates much like an affirmative defense. The un-
willingness to label it a defense has rested on the belief that, if so character-
ized, under Collins the accused would not be allowed to introduce evidence
to establish the existence of the exception-an absurd result. The excep-
tion is a defense, but not the ordinary criminal defense to which Collins was
intended to apply.
Party because of these terminological problems, a uniform approach
cannot be derived from case law. The present confusion prompts inquiry
into which approach is consonant with the tenor and purposes of the
extradition hearing and the political offense exception. At the outset, re-
course to the treaty language is of no help. For example, the Treaty with
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Spain provides in Article II that "[p]ersons shall be delivered up ... for
any of the following offenses," and then, in Article V, excepts a political
offense. 53 While the mandatory language authorizing extradition, subject
to enumerated exceptions, implies an affirmative defense, distinguished
commentators have contested this conclusion. 54
Policy considerations argue in favor of classifying the political offense
exception as an affirmative defense. There is a presumption in favor of
extradition to enhance world order and honor treaty obligations. 55 Courts
could require the requesting state to plead the absence of a political offense
in every case, but since many extradition cases do not involve political
offenders such a requirement would be an undue burden. Requiring the
magistrate himself to consider whether the exception is an issue in each
case is similarly unnecessary and cumbersome. The only feasible alterna-
tive is to place the burden on the accused. While the pro forma use of the
political offense exception in extradition hearings has in practice led to
increased pleading of the exception, 56 this profusion should not be insti-
tutionalized by requiring the requesting state or magistrate to raise the
issue in each case. The accused in a section 3184 hearing should bear the
burden of raising the issue of the political offense exception as an affirma-
tive defense, "which defeats or negates the claims for extradition." 57
INTRODUCING EVIDENCE; THE BURDEN
OF PROVING THE DEFENSE
Once the political offense exception is labelled an affirmative defense
which the accused must raise in the section 3184 hearing, there is the
additional question of how evidence in favor of or against the assertion of
the defense should be introduced. In addressing the issue, it is important
to remember that the magistrate's discretion with respect to the introduc-
tion of evidence is virtually unlimited. 58 The magistrate's discretion is
reinforced by the line of cases holding that the rules of criminal procedure
need not be followed, 59 and that there is no error if the magistrate excludes
evidence. 60
The magistrate's wide discretion has permitted the development of
several different approaches with respect to which party bears the burden
of introducing evidence as to the political offense exception. In some cases
the magistrate has confined the evidence to historical facts which were
judicially noticed. 61 Other cases have required the accused, through ex-
pert and documentary evidence, to discharge the burden of introducing
sufficient evidence by establishing a prima facie case that the acts charged
were of a political character. 62 Once the prima fade case is established,
magistrates have given the requesting state the opportunity to rebut. 63
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Finally, in a recent, important development, 64 one magistrate permitted
evidence from the State Department to define the United States' 65 view
of the political offense exception as applied to the facts at issue.
The normal rule with respect to the introduction of evidence requires
placing this burden on the same party which has the burden of raising the
issue. 66 Given the prior conclusion that the political offense exception is
an affirmative defense to extradition, the fugitive must bear the burden of
introducing evidence on the exception. Otherwise the burden of raising
the defense becomes almost meaningless because the accused would raise
the defense in every case and immediately cast the burden of rebuttal on
the requesting state. This reasoning follows by analogy to the Supreme
Court's conclusion in Leland v. Oregon, 67 which held that the accused bears
the burden of introducing evidence if he has raised an affirmative defense.
Beyond Leland, the policy of promoting international extradition also
suggests placing the initial burden of coming forward with the evidence
on the accused. On the other hand, for the accused to be treated fairly, he
must be able to introduce evidence beyond what the magistrate chooses
to judicially notice. Evidence concerning the circumstances of the offense
may be necessary for an adequate decision on the political offense issue.
The approach which best accommodates the procedural 68 and substan-
tive 69 concerns embodied in the exception is a hybrid derived from
McMullen and Eain. 70 For the reasons noted above, the accused should bear
the initial burden and have the opportunity of introducing sufficient evi-
dence to place the defense at issue, a quantum represented by a prima facie
case. 71 The requesting state may rest, if it feels the quantum of proof
needed to successfully assert the defense has not been met. In most cases,
however, to increase the chance of obtaining the extradition, the request-
ing state should introduce its own evidence to rebut the accused's political
offense argument. 72
There remains one important issue concerning the introduction of evi-
dence during the hearing when the exception is at issue: the role of State
Department evidence. Currently, the magistrate has discretion 73 through-
out the proceedings to permit State Department evidence on the nature of
the offense committed. In McMullen, the magistrate did not permit State
Department evidence, 74 and the circuit court in Eain voiced a similar
discomfort with executive input. 75 This discomfort is difficult to explain
in light of the frequent criticisms of judicial insensitivity to complex inter-
national concerns. 76 The State Department will probably seek to declare
its position only in the few controversial terrorist cases-precisely when
judicial understanding of the foreign setting needs to be enhanced.
Assuming that there ought to be a political offense exception 77 and that
the judiciary is the institution to decide upon it, 78 courts should favor the
introduction of State Department evidence to further the process of mak-
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ing informed decisions. Significantly, a State Department official has de-
clared his satisfaction with this approach in the only case where State
Department evidence was used. 79 Naturally, great weight should be ac-
corded the State Department evidence. 80 However, it ought not be dis-
positive, since the decision is ultimately the magistrate's. 81
THE BURDEN OF PERSUASION
After the accused raises the political offense exception and introduces the
prima facie case, and the requesting state rebuts, the magistrate must
decide the ultimate issue: does the record support the successful assertion
of the defense as a bar to extradition? In Ramos v. Diaz, the accused was
required to show that the act was probably political. 82 This is the closest
any court has come to discussing the burden of persuasion. The ultimate
burden of proof in cases where the evidence is in equipoise has rarely been
at issue because in most cases the factual situation fits within one of the
several recognized categories of the political offense exception. 83 Thus, the
magistrate may frequently rule as a matter of law.
General rules of evidence require that the party with the burden of
pleading a fact will have the burden of persuasion as well. 84 As discussed
above, the burden of introducing the political offense exception should be
borne by the fugitive. It follows that the fugitive should bear the ultimate
burden of persuasion. This is in keeping with labelling the political offense
exception an affirmative defense. 85 A countervailing consideration in
favor of casting the burden of persuasion on the requesting state is the
accused's lack of access to evidence. 86 Who should bear the burden is thus
a difficult issue. As with other issues of extradition law, the presumption
in favor of extradition should settle this issue in favor of the requesting
state. Following Ramos, the courts should require the accused to prove that
his offense was probably political. 87
CONCLUSION
There is considerable confusion over the procedural operation of the Sec-
tion 3184 judicial hearing when the political offense exception is raised as
a defense. Procedural uniformity should be the goal. Moreover, the current
frustration with the political offense exception may owe much to the
absence of State Department input during the judicial process. This note
has suggested four proposals for reform: placing the burden of raising the
exception on the accused as a defense to extradition; requiring the accused
to make a prima facie case, which the requesting state may rebut; solicita-
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tion by the magistrate of evidence from the State Department as to the
United States' view on the political offense exception when terrorist con-
duct is at issue; and placing the burden of persuasion on the fugitive.
Unifying authority must establish these proposals. The operation of the
system has produced confusion, and the magistrates themselves cannot
solve the problem. Either Congress should act, by making changes in the
statute authorizing the judicial hearing, or the Supreme Court should
resolve the current conflict in the approaches taken by magistrates and
judges between and even within the circuits. The former avenue is the
more promising. Congress drafted the original statutory provisions and is
capable of reforming them. 88 In contrast, it is difficult to imagine either
the accused or requesting state reaching the Supreme Court on grounds of
procedural irregularities between courts. Absent reform, federal magis-
trates should not view the frequent assertion that they have wide discre-
tion in an extradition hearing as warranting an ad hoc procedural
determination.
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